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COMMENTS
CONSENT DECREES: CAN THEY WITHSTAND THE
CHARGE OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION?
INTRODUCTION
There has been substantial litigation under the equal em-
ployment opportunity provisions' of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.2 In spite of this activity, minorities and
women are still disproportionately represented in the low in-
come strata of society. 3 Recently, a new problem has been
added to the complexities of Title VII litigation. Even as offi-
cial reports4 reflect the dearth of progress under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, reverse discrimination lawsuits threaten a
fundamental aspect of Title VII procedures: compliance
through conciliation, as embodied in consent decrees.
Congress clearly directed the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC), the federal administrative agency
responsible for implementing much of Title VII, to conciliate
charges brought before it. Conciliation and settlement may
e 1979 by Evet Abt.
1. For an overview of developments in employment discrimination law, see Bel-
ton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and
Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U. L. REV. 225 (1976). A review of major develop-
ments under Title VII, its effects upon the National Labor Relations Act, and problems
still requiring resolution is found in Jones, The Development of the Lau Under Title
VII Since 1965: Implications of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. (1976-1977).
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1)-(17)
(1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. See 5 U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT-1974, at 470 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORTI.
A comparison of median weekly earnings of workers engaged in full-time employ-
ment reveals that, overall, minorities earn only 80.9% of the income of whites, and
women earn only 60.8% of the income of men. Id.
4. See generally sources cited note 3 supra.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(b) (Supp. V 1975) provides in pertinent part that: "If
the Commission determines . . . that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge (of discrimination) is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, concil-
iation, and persuasion." See also 110 CONG. REC. 2566-67 (1964) (House debate on
amendment to clarify the EEOC's duty to conciliate prior to resorting to the courts);
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 150 (1963), reprinted in [19641 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2404 (stating the committee's belief that enforcement of
employment discrimination cases through the courts rather than by administrative
cease-and-desist orders would encourage settlement of complaints). See also Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
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occur in several ways.
Aggrieved individuals bringing suit under Title VII may
reach a settlement with the respondent employers prior to any
judicial finding of discrimination. Similarly, class actions may
be settled prior to litigation on the. merits, subject to court
approval of the agreement.7 A settlement agreement will typi-
cally provide for court approval and formal issuance of a de-
cree,8 containing provisions denying liability for past discrimi-
natory practices, but assuming responsibility for implementing
non-discriminatory practices in hiring and promotion.' The
settlements will often contain specific goals and timetables
detailing the steps which the employer must take to include
minorities and women in his workforce.10 The conciliation pro-
cess is valuable because it reduces the cost of compliance,
6. See, e.g., EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975) (set-
tlement between aggrieved party and employer did not bar later court action by
EEOC); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (plaintiff
who alleged a class action but later settled individually with employer required to
submit evidence to the court that the proposed compromise would not prejudice the
rights of class members); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 8903
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (plaintiff and employer reached agreement prior to suit brought by
EEOC covering same charges).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides for court approval of dismissals or compromises
involving class actions. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1797 (1972 & Supp. 1978), for a discussion of procedural concerns under
Rule 23(e). For cases in which class actions were settled prior to extensive litigation,
see, e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union of New York, 384 F. Supp. 585
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976);
Muldrow v. H.K. Porter Co., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,423 (W.D. Ala. 1975). Further
discussion of the implications of Rule 23(e) in the context of reverse discrimination
challenges to consent decrees follows at text accompanying notes 145-148 infra.
8. 119771 1 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) $ 2336. Very few conciliation agreements
are successfully negotiated by the EEOC. Between July 1, 1972, and March 31, 1973,
a total of 2,107 attempted conciliations resulted in only 533 settlements. CIVIL RIGHTS
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 525. The number of successful conciliations
should be compared to the backlog of cases awaiting conciliation as of June 30, 1973
(6,162). Id. at 529. For a critique and an analysis of conciliation procedures, see Adams,
Toward Fair Employment and the EEOC: A Study of Compliance Procedures Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Aug. 31, 1972) (EEOC Research Division
study).
9. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 524. See, e.g., American
Telephone & Telegraph Consent Order, [19731 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:73; Steel
Industry Consent Order, [19741 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:125.
10. The goals and timetables generally outline an agreed-upon percentage of
minorities and women to be hired in order to remedy past discrimination. Statistics
are used to indicate the appropriate number of minorities and women to be recruited
or promoted, considering factors such as vacancies in the work force and the nature of
the available labor pool. See generally [19761 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 1301-
1308. For a discussion of the provisions constituting a well-planned and effective con-
sent decree, see Comment, Title VII Consent Decrees: Affirmative Inaction?, 18 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 517 (1978).
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avoids protracted litigation, and hopefully induces change
without confrontation."
It is precisely the conciliation process which is threatened
by recent developments in employment discrimination law.
Title VII prohibits the preferential treatment of any
group on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." However, courts have approved preferential treatment
as part of the remedy for proven discrimination.': Some courts
have struck down voluntary affirmative action programs on the
rationale that no admission or judicial finding of past discrimi-
nation was made.'4 Consent decrees, with standard denials of
liability for past discrimination, may be subject to challenge as
orders for preferential relief without a judicial finding of dis-
crimination. The affirmative provisions of a decree may be
regarded as reverse discrimination by incumbent employees or
11. Adams, supra note 8, at 130.
12. § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group ....
13. See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622
(2d Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 895 (1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532
(W.D.N.C. 1971).
14. In the context of school hiring, promotion, or lay-offs, courts have rejected
voluntary affirmative action programs in Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993
(2d Cir. 1976); Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va.
1976); Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal.
1972). It is arguable that in these cases the plans operated in such a manner as to
exclude virtually all white males from consideration for hiring, promotion, or retention
in the jobs. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 722 (1976). In
the Cramer case, the plaintiff contended that he was denied the offer for a permanent
position due to reverse discrimination on the basis of sex. The defendants had solicited
his application for the position, but only interviewed female applicants in an attempt
to conform hiring to federal and state guidelines. The court held for the plaintiff,
reasoning that "where the only difference between two persons competing for the same
job is a difference in sex, then the Equal Protection Clause requires that they not be
treated differently on the account that one is male and the other is female." 415 F.
Supp. at 678. The female candidate who was hired was admittedly qualified for the
job. The question thus remains whether the court would have treated the program
differently if the defendants had at least interviewed male applicants and still had
chosen the female applicant who was equally as qualified as the plaintiff.
For cases in which reverse discrimination was claimed in the context of employ-
ment, see, e.g., Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D.
La. 1976); Brunetti v. City of Berkeley, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,804 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
These cases reflect a reluctance to approve affirmative action plans which touch upon
the expectations of other employees where a specific judicial finding of past discrimina-
tion has not been made.
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non-minority job applicants. The issue thus raised is whether
the employer may use the consent decree as a defense in a
subsequent reverse discrimination action. The underlying dis-
pute is, of course, the validity of affirmative action plans,
whether court-ordered, negotiated, or voluntary."'
The purpose of this comment is to examine the traditional
and precedential role of consent decrees in Title VII litigation
in light of recent reverse discrimination cases. An initial discus-
sion of the legal contexts in which negotiated settlements occur
will illustrate the usefulness of consent decrees under Title VII.
Although discussion will focus primarily upon consent decrees
negotiated between the government and the employer, gener-
ally the issues raised in this comment affect negotiated settle-
ments between private individuals and employers, and class
actions as well.
An analysis of the competing legal concepts of prohibition
of preferential treatment versus affirmative action will illumi-
nate the difficulties confronting employers who enter into nego-
tiated settlements embodied in consent decrees or voluntary
affirmative action plans. Remedies to these problems surface
from that analysis with primary focus on equitable treatment
of all parties affected by a consent decree. In this way it is
hoped that cooperation with the conciliation process will result.
CONSENT DECREES: THEIR TRADITIONAL FUNCTION
Invoking the Conciliation Process
Conciliation and settlement may occur at various points
in time under the statutory scheme of Title VII. For an ag-
grieved party, the first step on the road to conciliation or litiga-
tion is the filing of a charge with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC is obligated to
send notice to the employer of the charge of discrimination,"'
and must also defer the charge to any state agency authorized
to resolve it.'" The state agency may be able to conciliate the
charge, or an employer may choose to settle before further ac-
tion is taken by the EEOC and to submit the settlement for
EEOC approval."'
15. See text accompanying notes 48-58 infra.
16. § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975), provides that "notice of the
charge . . . shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within
ten days" after the charge of discrimination is made.
17. § 708(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (Supp. V 1975).
18. EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19a (1977) provide:
At any time subsequent to a preliminary investigation and prior to
the issuance of a determination as to reasonable cause, the District Direc-
[Vol. 19
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The EEOC assumes jurisdiction of the charge if no state
redress is available, or if state authorities do not resolve the
dispute within sixty days. 9 If state agencies do not settle the
dispute, the EEOC will investigate and determine reasonable
cause. A finding of no reasonable cause will result in the issu-
ance of a right to sue letter."9 If reasonable cause is found, the
EEOC must attempt conciliation prior to issuing a suit letter
or prior to initiating suit itself." If the EEOC cannot complete
its investigation of the charge within 180 days, the aggrieved
party may request a right to sue letter when that time period
expires.22
Finally, an EEOC Commissioner may also file charges
with the Commission on behalf of aggrieved parties,':' or may
tors, or other designated officers, may engage in settlement discussions.
The District Directors, or other designated officers, may make and ap-
prove settlements on behalf of the Commission, in those cases where such
authority has been delegated to them by the Commission.
Thus, the employer may conciliate the charge with the EEOC prior to investigation,
or may seek to reach agreement with the charging party and have the charge with-
drawn. A charge can only be withdrawn with EEOC approval. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9
(1977).
19. § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975).
20. § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). Regardless of what
findings state or federal authorities make, the charging party's final recourse is always
in federal court. For cases in which it has been held that the absence of a finding of
reasonable cause by the EEOC cannot bar suit on a charge of discrimination, see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
21. § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975), obligates the EEOC to
conciliate.
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII and enabled the EEOC to sue in its own
capacity. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86
Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000). Previously, the Attorney General had authority
to litigate § 707 pattern-or-practice suits. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 707, 78 Stat. 261 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (Supp. V 1975)). Now
the Commission may initiate an original suit on behalf of an aggrieved party pursuant
to § 706(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975), and may also file pattern-or-
practice suits pursuant to § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (Supp. V 1975).
22. § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The backlog of cases before the EEOC
generates a 2 to 3 year delay prior to investigation. B. ScHLE1 & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 14, at 769 n.8, 774.
Filing on behalf of an aggrieved party allows the EEOC to continue the suit even
though the party involved may not wish to continue due to intimidation or other
reasons. B. ScHLEA & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 836.
23. § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975), allows the EEOC Commis-
sioners to file on behalf of an aggrieved party. Pursuant to § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1), the EEOC is authorized "to bring a civil action against any respondent
not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge."
(emphasis added).
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initiate charges alleging a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion."
This brief overview of pre-litigation procedural steps under
Title VII reveals many opportunities for informal settlement of
disputes. However, the opportunities for conciliation are re-
duced if employers do not receive protection from reverse dis-
crimination suits arising from such informal settlement. With-
out some judicial protection of a consent decree, the employer
would do better with a litigated judgment.
The Approved Settlement and The Courts' Concerns
Assume that the investigatory powers of the EEOC have
been triggered by a charge either by an individual or by a
member of the Commission. Reasonable cause is determined;
settlement negotiations between the government and the em-
ployer result in agreement; and the parties apply to the court
for approval of the settlement. Once the settlement is approved
and a decree issued, how do the courts treat the decree in
subsequent litigation?
In order to delineate court treatment of consent decrees in
subsequent litigation, focus here is on agreements between the
government and an employer. Consent decrees, like contracts,
only bind those who are party to them.2" Thus, consent decrees
negotiated between the government and an employer are vul-
nerable to later challenge by the very discriminatees desig-
nated to receive relief under the settlement."
Challenges to a consent decree by the very individuals
designated to receive relief under the settlement truly place
courts in a quandary. 7 On the one hand, the adequacy of the
24. § 707(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (Supp. V 1975). Pattern-or-practice suits
allege systematic discrimination, and often are brought against entire industries. Sec-
tion 707(e) states that all pattern-or-practice actions "shall be conducted in accord-
ance with the procedures set forth in section 706 of this Act." Section 706 sets forth
the procedure of filing of a charge, investigation and determination of reasonable
cause, and conciliation.
25. See, e.g., Manning v. General Motors Corp., 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. $ 8325 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), aff'd sub noin, Manning v. Int'l Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied sub nor. Manning v. General Motors, 410 U.S. 946 (1973); EEOC v. Kimberly
Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
26. See United States v. City of Jackson, Miss., 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975).
See also text accompanying notes 30-39 infra. Technically, discriminatees are not
parties to a consent decree negotiated between the government and an employer, even
though relief is directed toward them under the settlement.
27. The place of the courts in public law litigation and their departure from
traditional concepts of adjudication is assayed in Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). Professor Chayes lists the diver-
[Vol. 19
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relief is determined at the time the consent decree is entered
for most discriminatees in a very real sense; few individuals can
afford to pursue their individual claims further."' On the other
gences between traditional concepts of adjudication and the new roles of courts in
public law litigation as follows:
(1) The scope of the lawsuit is not exogenously given but is shaped
primarily by the court and the parties.
(2) The party structure is not rigidly bilateral but sprawling and
amorphous.
(3) The fact inquiry is not historical and adjudicative but predictive
and legislative.
(4) Relief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form
logically derived from substantive liability and confined in its impact to
the immediate parties; instead it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on
flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important consequences
for many persons including absentees.
(5) The remedy is not imposed but negotiated.
(6) The decree does not terminate judicial involvement in the affair:
its administration requires the continuing participation of the court.
(7) The judge is not passive, his function limited to analysis and
statement of governing legal rules; he is active, with responsibility not
only for credible fact evaluation but for organizing and shaping the litiga-
tion to ensure a just and viable outcome.
(8) The subject matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private
individuals about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of
public policy.
Id. at 1302.
Juggling the interests in public law litigation is conceptually a far more difficult
enterprise than balancing the relative rights and wrongs under traditional equity adju-
dication, if only because the wrongs are not always easy to specify. The number of
parties involved in public law litigation serves to complicate the balancing process
enormously.
28. Section 706(k) of Title VII provides that the court at its discretion may award
reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). Private
attorneys are likely to take only those cases in which the charging party will almost
certainly prevail, however, leaving the weak or difficult cases to the resolution of the
Commission. See CIVIL RIGtrrs COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 519-20. Addition-
ally, where a single charging party is finally notified that he or she must engage a
private attorney to file suit, considerable changes have occured in that party's status.
[Clonsiderable time has passed since the discrimination occurred, and
witnesses and evidence may have long since disappeared, making private
suit even more difficult. Moreover, the charging party has exposed him-
self or herself to the inevitable consequences, however subtle, of filing a
charge against one's employers.
Id. at 542. William H. Brown III, chairman of the EEOC, indicated that only ten per-
cent of the cases in which the EEOC had been unable to reach a conciliation were
subsequently taken to court by the charging party. See Equal Employment Opportuni-
ties Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 40 (1969). The chairman
also stated:
Yet in order to realize the rights guaranteed him by Title VII, the disad-
vantaged individual is told that in the pinch he must become a litigant,
which is an expensive proposition and traditionally the prerogative of the
rich. Thus minorities are locked out of the proffered remedy by the very
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hand, the policy of conciliation weighs heavily on the side of
upholding the decrees as negotiated. 9 The negotiation process
would be discredited if all the hard work in reaching a settle-
ment could later be undone by dissatisfied third parties, even
if those parties were victims of the employer's discrimination.
Courts are faced with challenges in the form of motions to
intervene as well as subsequent suits.
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc.3
demonstrates the policy considerations inherent in a judicial
decision regarding intervenors' challenges to a negotiated set-
tlement. In Allegheny-Ludlum, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals examined the policy bases supporting the lower court's
approval of consent decrees entered into by the government
and nine steel companies.3 Several intervenors were permitted
to challenge the consent decree's provisions for back pay, 32
which they considered to be a priori insufficient. 33 The court's
definition of the main issue in the case created a substantial
obstacle to the success of the intervenors' arguments.
In the court's analysis, the intervenors were challenging
the authority of government agencies to "lawfully conciliate
condition that led to its creation, and the credibility of the Government's
guarantees is accordingly diminished.
Id. at 40.
29. See note 5 supra. Additionally, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), details the policy of conciliation
underlying Title VII:
Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred
means for achieving [the elimination of unlawful employment discrimi-
nation]. To this end, Congress created the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state
and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Com-
mission, would have an opportunity to settle disputes through confer-
ence, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was permit-
ted to file a lawsuit.
Id. at 44.
30. 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975).
31. Id. at 834. The EEOC, the Department of Labor, and the Department of
Justice were all engaged in the negotiations.
32. Fm. R. Civ. P. 24 provides for intervention as of right and permissive inter-
vention. The procedure for intervention and its possible uses in the context of reverse
discrimination cases will be discussed more fully at notes 125-135 infra.
Additionally, the legality of the waivers required in order to receive the back pay
award was challenged. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d
826, 851 (5th Cir. 1971). The appellants also contended that the decree did not provide
for adequate supervision by the courts or the governmental agencies involved. Id. at
864. Thpse issues are not specifically addressed in the text as the same policy rationales
upholding the back pay award suffice to support other provisions in the decree.
33. 517 F.2d at 862. The decree provided for a $500 back pay award for each
eligible employee.
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and settle by consent decree charges of discrimination cutting
across an entire industry. . . ...3" Thus, public policy weighed
heavily on the side of approval of the consent decree. 5 In ana-
lyzing the intervenors' arguments against the decrees, the court
balanced the affirmative action objectives of Title VII against
the strong congressional policy favoring voluntary compliance.
Providing adequate relief for discriminatees is, of course,
the goal of Title VII. Yet the court recognized that voluntary
compliance "over an extended period of time will contribute
significantly toward ultimate achievement of statutory
goals."' :" Additionally, those individuals dissatisfied with the
amount of the back pay aWard could sue for more if they re-
fused the proffered relief.3" The decrees only bound the govern-
ment, the nine steel companies, and those employees who ac-
cepted back pay awards pursuant to its terms. The court
pointed out: "If the decrees were vacated, however . . .
litigation-free back pay would be lost to those whose claims
were factually weak and, though arguably entitled to some
back pay, probably could not otherwise recover.' ''3
The court refused to vacate approval of the consent de-
crees. The policy of voluntary compliance, the contractual na-
ture of consent decrees, and national policy considerations out-
weighed the intervenors' concerns for the sufficiency of the re-
lief under the decrees.3 1
Courts consistently uphold Title VII actions against em-
ployers who have entered consent decrees. '0 The decrees do not
34. Id. at 850-51.
35. The standard of review in Allegheny-Ludlum was abuse of discretion, also a
great burden on the intervenors. Id. at 850. In framing the issue as it did, however,
the court increased the already heavy burden on the intervenors.
36. Id. (quoting Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union of N.Y. & Vic.,
514 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975)).
37. 517 F.2d at 864.
38. Id.
39. Similar considerations are evident where members of the class in a private
class action suit are themselves dissatisfied with the proposed settlement reached by
the representatives of the class and the employer. See Cotton v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry
Co., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 326 (N.D. Ala. 1975). In this case, the court found that
the agreement, which was negotiated under the supervision of the court, would be
implemented as agreed. Even though the settlement bound all class members as to
those provisions necessitating uniformity, such as the seniority provisions, class mem-
bers could still "opt out" on other provisions and sue for additional relief (e.g. back
pay).
40. The defendant's argument ignores the number of cases litigated
as class actions which have held that a consent decree entered into by
the government and an allegedly discriminatory company does not bind
by collateral estoppel those persons who have not accepted compensation
under the decree or signed a release. Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor
19791
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bar subsequent litigation involving the same charges of dis-
crimination, so long as the discriminatees have not accepted
relief pursuant to the settlement." Although the subsequent
litigation will generally be allowed to continue, in point of fact
much of the subject matter of the second suit is limited by the
prior consent decree.2
Additionally, courts will not permit the substance of a
consent decree to be reviewed in another forum, both upon
principles of comity and upon recognition of the impact such
review would have on the negotiation process. 3 Reviewing the
provisions of a decree in another forum raises the possibility of
subjecting one party to conflicting'orders of court." Courts are
so wary of collateral attacks upon the substance of decrees that
dissatisfied third parties are advised to seek intervention rather
than attacking the provisions at a later date.'" However, as
Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d
721 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Salinas v. Roadway
Express, Inc., SA-71-CA-254, Western District of Texas, May 1, 1975.
Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,754, at 7167 (S.D. Tex.
1975).
41. Id.
42. Compare the decision in a long chain of litigation in Rodgers v. United
States Steel Corp., 69 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (certification of class action), with
the later decision regarding the scope of issues before the court, Rogers v. United States
Steel Corp., 70 F.R.D. 639 (W.D. Pa. 1976). In certifying the class for proceeding
against U.S. Steel, the court rejected defendant's arguments that injunctive relief
provided in the steel industry consent decrees pre-empted the plaintiffs' suit as plain-
tiffs had made no showing of a need for relief beyond that provided in the consent
decree. The court stated:
ITihe Decrees do not appear to provide "the most complete relief possi-
ble" under Title VII... it is clearly conceivable, as another court noted
in certifying a (b)(2) class under quite similar circumstances that this
court might ultimately ". . . issue an injunction differing from the one
consented to in Allegheny-Ludlum in the specifics of its scope or imple-
mentation." (citation omitted).
69 F.R.D. at 387-88. When, in the subsequent proceeding, the plaintiffs asked the court
to issue an injunction against the tender of back pay to affected employees of defen-
dant's plant pursuant to the steel industry consent decree, however, the court clearly
outlined those issues which were "litigated and decided in an appropriate forum," and
therefore not before the court in the second proceeding. The adequacy of the back pay
fund, the manner of distribution of the fund, and the adequacy of the injunctive relief
provided by the consent decrees were all considered non-litigable in the second pro-
ceeding. 70 F.R.D. at 641. The decrees referred to in the decisions are the ones ap-
proved in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1975), discussed at text accompanying notes 30-39 supra.
43. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,762, at
7192 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
44. Construction Industry Combined Comm. v. International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 513, 67 F.R.D. 664 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (employers seeking to prohibit
enforcement of consent decree entered into by union with EEOC must intervene in case
before the judge who entered the decree).
45. O'Burn v. Shapp, 393 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (where plaintiffs sought
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Allegheny-Ludlum indicates, policy factors militate against
intervention.
In brief, discriminatees dissatisfied with a settlement ne-
gotiated between the government and an employer encounter
a judicial "Catch 22." They must seek intervention in order to
challenge the decree, yet the policy of conciliation weighs heav-
ily against intervention or a successful challenge." A decree is
not determinative of the rights of those not party to it, yet it
affects the interests of many employees who did not negotiate
or sign it.' An employer who implements a consent decree, and
is subsequently charged with reverse discrimination, encoun-
ters an equally frustrating double bind.
COMPETING DEMANDS ON THE TITLE VII MANDATE
Reverse Discrimination
It is not surprising that a society which prizes the ethic of
advancement through individual merit would encounter pro-
found conceptual difficulties in its attempts to eliminate the
effects of discrimination through promotion of disadvantaged
groups. 8 Also central to current American political philosophy
is the concept of evenhanded treatment before the law.'9 This
theme, simply stated, is that the law should be neutral in its
application, neither preferring nor disfavoring any group on the
basis of race, national origin, religious beliefs, or sex. 50 The
traditional concepts of the competitive ethic and of equal treat-
ment before the law engender conflict when special efforts are
made to include disenfranchised groups in the economic
mainstream.
The real conflict between "affirmative action" and
"reverse discrimination" is the definition of equality. When
certain groups in society have been severed from the principal
social and economic institutions by either social or legal norms,
a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from hiring according to provisions of
consent decree, court denied the injunction on the basis that intervention was proper
method of seeking relief rather than collateral attack upon the consent decree).
46. United States v. City of Jackson, Miss., 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. Id.
48. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 375 (1966).
49. Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality: Legislative Classifications, Deseg-
regation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494 (1977).
50. See, e.g., Comment, But Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others: A
Look at the Equal Protection Argument Against Minority Preferences, 12 DUQUESNE
L. REV. 580 (1974); Note, Reverse Discrimination: A Summary of the Arguments with
Further Consideration of Its Stigmatizing Effect, 16 WASHBURN L. REV. 421 (1977).
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an essential question arises as to whether simply declaring an
end to formal discrimination will suffice to end it." Even if
discrimination against minorities" and women 3 is deemed
unconstitutional, both groups are left where they were prior to
the termination of legally sanctioned discrimination-at the
bottom of the economic pile. 5" The issue then becomes whether,
with legal impediments to advancement removed, the status
achieved by minorities and women is sufficiently "equal" to
render inequitable any further manipulations of the legal and
economic infrastructure of society on behalf of the disadvan-
taged groups.
This dispute becomes particularly volatile when the expec-
tations of the majority are infringed upon in the course of ad-
vancing the interests of minorities and women. A compelling
argument can and should be made that the issue of "reverse
discrimination" is somewhat of a legal fiction; that in reality
the advancement of minorities and women up the economic
ladder is not a bestowal of privilege but a removal of unearned
benefits from members of the majority.55 The argument, how-
ever convincing it may be conceptually, logically, or morally,
will probably not dissuade those accustomed to the established
modes of distributing benefits from insisting upon the mainte-
nance of the status quo.
Many individuals who would never intentionally discrimi-
nate have relied on the individual merit ethic, namely, that
51. Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment
Discrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1975).
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
53. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
54. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
55. The documentation of past discrimination against minorities
also serves to document its counterpoint: unfair advantages to non-
minorities. If minorities are under-represented in higher levels of educa-
tion it is safe to assume that non-minorities are overrepresented. Stated
simply, what society has been taking from its minorities, it has been
giving to its non-minorities. The reverse discrimination aspect of affirma-
tive action is, in reality, the removal of that benefit which American
society has for so long bestowed, without question, upon its privileged
classes. The question, viewed in this light, becomes: "Is the removal of a
benefit, given for centuries to some at the expense of others, truly a
discrimination against that long-favored class?"
Comment, The Myth of Reverse Race Discrimination: An Historical Perspective, 23
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 322 (1974). Cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial
Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974), in which the argument is made that
awarding advantages to minorities does not rise to the type of discrimination requiring
constitutional protection as it is not '"suspect' in a constitutional sense for a majority,
any majority, to discriminate against itself." Id. at 727.
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benefits will be distributed on the basis of some "objective"
standard." Admission to graduate school, for example, should
be determined by test scores and grade point averages,57 and
eligibility for transfer or promotion should be ascertained by
test scores or seniority." Whether or not these expectations are
realistic, whether or not an "objective" determination of an
individual's merit can be made, the sudden defeat of these
expectations will be met with resistance.
The recent case of Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke" epitomizes the resistance to affirmative action pro-
grams. Alan Bakke, a white male, was denied admission to the
University of California Medical School at Davis on two sepa-
rate occasions. The medical school operated a special admis-
sions program which selected minority applicants for admis-
sion into the school. Mr. Bakke brought suit against the school,
contending that he was "better qualified" to enter graduate
school than the specially admitted minorities and was thus
excluded on the basis of race.'" He contended that the Davis
special admissions program violated his rights under the four-
teenth amendment, the California Constitution, and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
The Supreme Court decision in this well-publicized case
indicates the difficulties of balancing the competing interests
of minority advancement and majority expectations. Justice
Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart,
56. For a discussion of the validity of standardized tests in admissions, see
O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher
Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 731-37 (1971); Reddish, Preferential Law School Admis-
sions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 343, 373-77 (1974).
57. Several recent cases have highlighted the expectations of the majority re-
garding admissions to graduate or professional schools. See Defunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974); Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537,
384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976). These two cases involved claims that the plaintiffs, both
white males, were discriminated against on the basis of race, in that they were denied
entrance to a professional school, while members of minority groups with lower test
scores and grade point averages were admitted.
58. Examples of the conflicting expectations in the employment area may be
found in the recent cases of Hefner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 7515 (E.D. La. 1977); Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1977),
vacated and remanded as moot, 572 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1978). See also Comment,
Racial Discrimination in Employment: Retroactive Seniority Awarded Job Applicants
as a Title VII Remedy for Hiring Discrimination, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 397 (1977); Com-
ment, The Continuing Validity of Seniority Systems Under Title VII: Sharing the
Burden of Discrimination, 8 LOYOLA CH. L.J. 882 (1977).
59. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
60. Id. at 2741.
61. Id. at 2742.
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Rehnquist, and Stevens in a separate opinion, found the spe-
cial admissions program at Davis to be unlawful and ordered
Mr. Bakke admitted.2 Justice Powell reached the fourteenth
amendment question in his opinion, while the other Justices
who found the program unlawful did so on statutory grounds
alone."3 Justice Powell did not eliminate the consideration of
race in affirmative action programs, however. Justices Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined him on this aspect
of the case, and dissented from the finding that the U.C. Davis
special admissions program was impermissible."
The Bakke case will undoubtedly receive much scholarly
treatment. It deserves some attention at this point for several
reasons. The nine Justices were obviously divided on the af-
firmative action-reverse discrimination dichotomy. The ques-
tion of how to implement a constitutionally permissible affirm-
ative action program still remains. Affirmative action pro-
grams under Title VII will surely receive close judicial scrutiny
as the meaning and parameters of the Bakke decision are delin-
eated in subsequent cases. Social norms of integration on one
side, and the competitive ethic on the other, may be exacer-
bated under Title VII precisely because Title VII affects a vital
area in most people's lives-employment.
Due to the important nature of the interests affected by
Title VII, court decisions are not always consistent. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently invalidated a voluntary af-
firmative action plan implemented by an employer and a
union. 5 The program was challenged as constituting reverse
discrimination, as minorities with less seniority than whites
were selected for a special job-training program."6 The court of
appeal held the program invalid because there was no judicial
finding of past discrimination. 7 Even a finding of discrimina-
tion may not save an affirmative action plan if the appellate
court views the plan as having too great an impact on majority
expectations. Court decisions which require a judicial finding
62. Id. at 2739.
63. Id. at 2811 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Stevens, J.; joined by
Burger, C.J.; Stewart & Rehnquist, J.J.).
64. Id. at 2767.
65. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 47
U.S.L.W. 3401 (1978) (docket no. 78-435).
66. Id. at 222.
67. Id. at 227.
68. Chance v. Board of Examiners & Bd. of Educ., 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976).
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of discrimination hamper the conciliation process under Title
VII."
Other courts have reasoned that affirmative action pro-
grams under Title VII, whether court-ordered or voluntary, are
essential to accomplishing integration and must be upheld if
reasonable.70 The fact that the cases are not uniform in their
69. The dissent in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3401 (1978) (docket no. 78-435), vigorously objected to the major-
ity opinion's requirement of a judicial finding of discrimination. The dissent reasoned
that such a requirement would effectively eliminate voluntary compliance with Title
VII. 563 F.2d at 230.
70. Barnett v. Internationgl Harvester, 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 706 (W.D.
Tenn. 1976).
The recent case of United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144 (1977), also reflects the expectations of a white .group regarding legislative
reapportionment along racial lines. Under a redistricting plan to bring Kings County,
New York, into compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1970), the Hasidic Jewish community of Williamsburgh was split into two districts
in order to increase the proportion of nonwhite voters in the districts. Suit was brought
charging that assignment to voting districts solely on the basis of race was a violation
of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. 430 U.S. at 153. The Supreme Court
rejected petitioners' claims that use of racial criteria in redistricting is never permis-
sible, or usable only where a finding of prior discrimination has been made, and
also defeated the claim that use of a "racial quota" is never acceptable in. redistrict-
ing. Quite clearly in this case as well, two different but equally desirable social values
clashed: the ultimate goal of considerations of race being irrelevant in the political
process conflicted with the current necessity to advance participation in the political
process along racial lines so that the ultimate goal could be reached a bit more rapidly.
This case has further analytical value for reverse discrimination issues in that the
Court expresses a deferential attitude towards a congressional scheme that almost
necessitates the use of racial criteria in order to be carried out. Drawing upon two prior
cases for support, Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), and City of Richmond
v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1976), the Court stated:
Implicit in Beer and City of Richmond, then, is the proposition that the
Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the Voting Rights Act
from deliberately creating or preserving black majorities in particular
districts in order to ensure that its reapportionment plan complies with
§ 5 . . . . Section 5, and its authorization for racial redistricting where
appropriate to avoid abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, are constitutional. Contrary to petitioners' first argument, neither
the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per se rule
against using racial factors in districting and apportionment.
430 U.S. at 161.
The Court also emphasized the fact that "there was no fencing out the white
population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the plan did
not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength." Id. at 165.
The question arises whether the Court would remain deferential to the congres-
sional scheme and apply similar reasoning in a case involving the affirmative action-
reverse discrimination dichotomy under Title VII. The argument in such a case would
be that a carefully tailored program which did not disproportionately exclude white
participation, which was made in accord with a constitutionally permissible, congres-
sionally mandated program, would not violate the fourteenth amendment simply be-
cause it adversely impacted upon the expectations of whites. At least one district court
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treatment of challenges to affirmative action indicates the dif-
ficulty of balancing the interests and expectations of the non-
minority7' against the interests of minorities and women. The
balancing process is equally tortuous in the United States Su-
peme Court. There are few clearly just solutions when the
scales are so evenly weighted and the economic and social well-
being of the litigants so critically affected by any decision.7
The Delicate Balance: Minority Interests versus Majority
Expectations in the Supreme Court
A recurring theme in Title VII litigation is the extreme
difficulty of recompensing one group of employees without ad-
versely affecting other employees. A trilogy of recent Supreme
relied on similar reasoning to uphold an affirmative action program challenged as
constituting reverse discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Germann v. Kipp, 429
F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1977), vacated and remanded as moot, 572 F.2d 1258 (8th
Cir. 1978).
71. Where sufficient evidence of past discrimination is introduced, courts are
generally willing to order preferential relief. See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n of
Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Erie Human Relations Comm'n
v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971);
Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Common-
wealth v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Central Motor
Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971), supplemented, 352 F. Supp. 1253
(1972). The problem central to this comment is that courts may not look so favorably
upon voluntarily initiated affirmative action plans.
72. For an insightful analysis of the complexities inherent in any discussion of
"reverse discrimination," see Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treat-
ment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581 (1977). The author contends
that much confusion is generated in discussion of preferential treatment from a failure
to recognize three approaches to the topic. "The first of these perspectives concentrates
on what in fact is true of the culture, on what can be called the social realities . ...
The second perspective is concerned with the way things ought to be . . . . The third
perspective looks forward to the means by which the ideal may be achieved." Id. at
583. Given these three perspectives on the topic of preferential treatment:
[Ilt can almost immediately be seen that the question of whether some-
thing is racist or sexist is not as straightforward or unambiguous as may
appear at first. The question may be about social realities, about how the
categories of race or sex in fact function in the culture and to what effect.
Or the question may be about ideals, about what the good society would
make of race or sex. Or the question may be about instrumentalities,
about how, given the social realities as to race or sex, to achieve a closer
approximation of the idea.
Id. The present discussion of the topic revolves around this third category, and takes
a balancing approach between the competing demands on the Title VII mandate
primarily because the courts seem to encounter much difficulty in resolving the issue
of preferential treatment-reverse discrimination when one party before them has argu-
ably not received the customary treatment solely due to his race or sex. See Defunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733
(1978); Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976);
text accompanying note 57 supra.
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Court decisions involving Title VII gives some clues to the
Court's approach to balancing the competing expectations of
majority employees with the interests of the minority.
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.13 was an ex-
pansive decision on remedies under Title VII.14 The issue con-
fronted in Franks was whether non-employee minority job ap-
plicants who were discriminatorily denied employment as over-
the-road truck drivers with the respondent company could pro-
perly be awarded retroactive seniority given the phrasing of
section 703(h), which permits "bona fide" seniority systems to
stand. 5 Under section 703(h), it was unclear whether facially
neutral, unintentionally discriminatory seniority systems could
be altered or affected in order to provide relief for discrimina-
tees."6
The Court determined that a grant of retroactive seniority
was consistent with provisions of Title VII,"1 with legislative
history,78 and with the "make whole" objectives of Title VII.79
73. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
74. For discussions of the Court's decision, see Note, Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co.: Expanding the Remedy for Employment Discrimination, 1976 Der.
C.L. REv. 609 (1976); Note, Retroactive Seniority as a Remedy for Past Discrimina-
tion: Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 181 (1976); Jones,
Title VII, Seniority and the Supreme Court: Clarification or Retreat?, 26 KAN. L. REV.
1 (1977).
75. § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), provides that an
employer may "apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system
. . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
76. Prior to Franks, several courts of appeal had held that a neutral seniority
system could not be maintained where it perpetuated the effects of past discrimina-
tion; e.g., as in departmental seniority systems. See, e.g., Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d
648 (2d Cir. 1976); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975);
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); United States v. Roadway Express, Inc., 457 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006
(1971).
77. The Court also dealt with the problem of whether retroactive seniority could
be awarded consistent with § 706(g), which does not mention retroactive seniority as
a specific remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) provides in relevant part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstate-
ment or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
78. 424 U.S. at 758.
79. Id. at 763-64.
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The decision noted that benefits accruing from advanced sen-
iority are as important to incumbent employees as they would
be to non-employee discriminatees 0 The Court addressed the
concern, raised by the company, that a retroactive award of
seniority would impinge on the expectations of "innocent"
employees, stating:
It is apparent that denial of seniority relief to identifiable
victims of racial discrimination on the sole ground that
such relief diminishes the expectations of other, arguably
innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate
the central "make-whole" objective of Title VII. These
conflicting interests of other employees will, of course, al-
ways be present in instances where some scarce employ-
ment benefit is distributed among employees on the basis
of their status in the seniority hierarchy. . . . [We] find
untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be
denied merely because the interests of other employees
may thereby be affected.'
Thus the majority opinion recognized that expectations of non-
minority individuals would be displaced by the decision.
The dissent emphasized that the grant of retroactive sen-
iority to post-Act discriminatees would impact heavily on other
innocent employees instead of the employer, who originally
acted unlawfully."2 In response to the dissent's criticism that
the creation of a presumption favoring the award of retroactive
seniority would unnecessarily harm "perfectly innocent em-
ployees," 3 the majority opinion stated that "the result
[reached] today-which standing alone establishes that a
sharing of the burden of the past discrimination is presump-
80. Seniority standing in employment with respondent Bowman,
computed from the departmental date of hire, determines the order of
layoff and recall of employees. Further, job assignments for OTR (over-
the-road) drivers are posted for competitive bidding, and seniority is used
to determine the highest bidder. As OTR drivers are paid on a per-mile
basis, earnings are therefore to some extent a function of seniority. Addi-
tionally, seniority computed from company date of hire determines the
length of an employee's vacation and pension benefits. Obviously, merely
to require Bowman to hire the class 3 victim of discrimination falls far
short of a "make whole" remedy.
Id. at 767.
81. Id. at 774-75.
82. Id. at 788 (dissenting opinion of Powell, J.) (joined by Rehnquist, J.). Chiel
Justice Burger indicated a preference for awarding monetary damages rather than
competitive seniority to discriminatees, reasoning that pursuing this remedy would
tend to deter the employer from engaging in further discrimination while holding
harmless other employees. Id. at 780.
83. Id. at 788.
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tively necessary-is entirely consistent with any fair character-
ization of equity jurisdiction."" In a footnote to that sentence,
the majority opinion suggested the award of monetary damages
to each incumbent employee and discriminatee as a possible
remedy available to district courts. This suggestion was fol-
lowed by a disavowal of any views regarding the use of such a
remedy since the issue was not properly before the Court.15
That statement would have significant ramifications for em-
ployers who enter into consent decrees.
The Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. decision
demonstrated a greater concern for minority interests than
other decisions preceding Bakke." After Franks, the decisions
urge great caution in contemplating any expansion of remedies
for discriminatees which impacts on the expectations of non-
minority employees.
Although the Bakke case" may eventually symbolize the
concept of reverse discrimination, judicial recognition of the
concept originated in another case, McDonald v. Sante Fe
Transportation Co." In McDonald, two white males brought
suit against their employer alleging that they were discrimina-
torily discharged in violation of Title VII and section 1981 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.11 They, and one other employee,
a black male, were charged with misappropriating the property
84. Id. at 777.
85. Id. at 777 n.38. Chief Justice Burger apparently would apply the remedy of
monetary damages exclusively as a replacement for the remedy of retroactive seniority
for discriminatees. See note 82 supra. The majority opinion appears to suggest that
monetary damages could be awarded to any employee, discriminatee or otherwise,
whose status is adversely affected by sharing the burden of the employer's past dis-
crimination. Compare 424 U.S. at 777 n.38 (majority opinion) with 424 U.S. at 780
(dissenting opinion of Burger, C.J.).
86. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978); see
discussion accompanying notes 59-67 supra.
87. Id.
88. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). For a brief discussion of the case and its background,
see Note, Civil Rights Act-Section 1981-Title VII-Reverse Discrimination-Equal
Protection, 10 AKRON L. REv. 570 (1977); Comment, How Far Can Affirmative Action
Go Before It Becomes Reverse Discrimination?, 26 CATH. U. L. Rzv. 513 (1977); Note,
Civil Rights-Title VII-Applicability to Whites, 15 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 495 (1977);
Venick & Lane, Doubling the Price of Past Discrimination: The Employer's Burden
After McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 8 LoY. CHI. L. REv. 789, 801
(1977).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens . ...
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of the respondent company. The white males were dismissed;
the black employee was retained. The district court dismissed
the complaint at the pleading stage, and the court of appeals
affirmed.N The issues presented by the case were (1) whether
the white employee's (petitioner's) dismissal created a cause of
action under Title VII; and (2) whether section 1981 applied to
non-whites as well as to whites. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the appellate decision, finding that a cause of
action was stated under both statutes." The Court's decision
on the Title VII cause of action is of interest not so much for
its holding as for the vigor with which it was reached."
After examining legislative history, EEOC decisions, and
prior judicial decisions, 3 the Court refuted the argument that
the commission of a criminal offense against the employer re-
moved any protection which petitioners might have had under
Title VII:
We . . . hold today that Title VII prohibits racial discrimi-
nation against the white petitioners in this case upon the
same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes
and Jackson white.
' * * While Sante Fe may decide that participation in
a theft of cargo may render an employee unqualified for
employment this criterion must be "applied, alike to
members of all races," and Title VII is violated if, as peti-
tioners alleged, it was not.
.. . The Act prohibits all racial discrimination in
employment, without exception for any group of particular
employees, and while crime or other misconduct may be a
90. McDonald v. Sante Fe Transportation Co., 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975).
91. 427 U.S. at 278.
92. Further discussion of the § 1981 claim is omitted, as that claim is peripheral
to the analysis of this comment. The Court- also examined legislative history to deter-
mine that § 1981 was intended to protect white as well as black citizens from discrimi-
nation based on race. See 427 U.S. at 285-96.
93. The Court relied upon its prior decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and found many factual similarities between that case and
McDonald. In McDonnell a laid-off employee engaged in an illegal "stall-in" at the
petitioner's plant, and was fined for obstructing traffic. When the respondent employee
later applied for an open position with the petitioner, he was denied employment on
the basis that he had participated in illegal activities. The respondent brought suit
charging that he was denied the position on the basis of race. The Supreme Court held
that the respondent should be permitted to prove his claim against the employer.
"[Iti is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise." 411 U.S. at 801. The Court in McDonald found no difference between
allowing the respondent in McDonnell to prove his case, and allowing the petitioners
to prove theirs against Bowman Transportation Company.
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legitimate basis for discharge, it is hardly one for racial
discrimination." (emphasis in original).
Although the Court expressly noted that no consideration
is given to the permissibility of an affirmative action program,"
the strong language employed in the decision proved difficult
to ignore in ruling on the validity of such programs. McDonald
was cited several times in the Bakke decision for the proposi-
tion that an absolute preference based on race is clearly unlaw-
ful." The case accentuates the narrow line which employers
must tread to avoid charges of discrimination by majority or
minority group members.
Finally, the High Court decision in International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States97 merits brief discussion as
a further clue to the concerns of the members of the Court in
the area of employment discrimination. In a 7-2 decision,9" the
Court held that retroactive seniority could not be extended to
discriminatees "who suffered only pre-Act discrimination."9
Reliance upon legislative history provided the substantive ra-
tionale for its holding,'0 but the dictum in the decision appears
to be a more accurate indicator of the Court's concerns. In
remanding the case to the district court, the Supreme Court
noted that principles of equity apply when considering the
"legitimate expectations of non-victim employees" and the in-
terests of discriminatees.'1' The Court indicated a strong desire
that equitable principles apply where the "immediate imple-
94. 427 U.S. at 280-83.
95. Id. at 281 n.8.
96. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2750
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 2811 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Ste-
vens, J.; joined by Burger, C.J.; Stewart, J.; Rehnquist, J.).
97. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
98. Stewart, J., wrote the opinion for the Court, in which Burger, C.J., and
White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, J.J., joined. Marshall, J., filed a
concurring and dissenting opinion in which Brennan, J., joined. It is interesting to
compare the composition of the Justices supporting this decision with that of the
decision in Franks. See note 82 and accompanying text supra. The dissenters in Franks
were able to flavor the decision in Teamsters with the concern they displayed in the
former decision for the expectations of non-minority group members.
99. 431 U.S. at 356.
100. The majority opinion found that the legislative history of § 703(h), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) made it "clear that the routine application
of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII." 431 U.S. at
352. The dissent disputed the majority's interpretation of the legislative history:
"Congress was concerned with seniority expectations that had developed prior to the
enactment of Title VII, not with expectations arising thereafter to the extent that those
expectations were dependent on whites benefiting from unlawful discrimination." Id.
at 384.
101. 431 U.S. at 375.
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mentation of an equitable remedy threatens to impinge upon
the expectations of innocent parties."''02 These concepts reflect
much of the spirit of the Franks dissenters, namely, that the
majority had not sufficiently considered the expectations of
non-minority employees.'10 The decision tipped "the delicate
balance" once again, and the expectations of the majority
gained some protection at the expense of the interests of vic-
tims of discrimination.'0
These cases-Franks, McDonald, and Teamsters-
illustrate that the Court will contemplate some displace-
ment of expectations for non-minority employees in order to
accommodate discriminatees, but the balance is not easily
struck. The Supreme Court itself walks a tightrope between
the competing claims of discriminatees and non-victim
employees. These conflicting interests originate as demands on
employers, who must attempt to resolve the tension against a
backdrop of varying liability for damages.
Reverse Discrimination and Damages to Incumbent Employees
The Supreme Court's decision in Franks was practically
an invitation for district courts to award monetary damages to
non-minority employees adversely affected by affirmative ac-
tion plans implemented to remedy the employer's past discrim-
ination.' 5 The invitation was accepted in McAleer v. American
Telephone and Telegraph Co.'°0
The McAleer decision unfolded against the background of
a massive, industry-wide employment discrimination settle-
ment entered into by the federal government and A.T.&T.107
Pursuant to the terms of a consent decree, A.T.&T. began to
implement an affirmative action program containing goals,
timetables, and an "affirmative action override." The
"override" permitted A.T.&T. to disregard the collective bar-
gaining agreement provisions for promotion based on seniority
if it became necessary to comply with the goals and timetables
of the decree. 08 Plaintiff McAleer, a white male, was passed
102. Id.
103. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 781 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Comment, Affirmative Action: A Delicate Balance in Employment and
Education, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 581 (1977) (a review of recent cases affecting affirmative
action).
105. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
106. 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976).
107. See note 42 supra.
108. 416 F. Supp. at 437.
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over for promotion after approval of the decree. He brought suit
against A.T.&T. alleging that "he was entitled to promotion
under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement but
the job was given to a less qualified, less senior female solely
because of her sex."' 9
District Court Judge Gesell denied the plaintiff's request
for a promotion, on the ground that it would tend to prolong
past discrimination in contravention of the consent decree."10
He granted plaintiff's request for damages, however, over the
defendant's arguments that the consent decree operated as a
defense. The court noted that ordinarily one acting "pursuant
to a judicial order . . . is protected from liability arising from
the act,""' but refused to grant immunity to the defendant
because the record clearly indicated that A.T.&T. had not been
in compliance with federal law."' The consent decree itself
contained no admission of liability, nor was there a judicial
finding of discrimination at the time the decree was entered."3
The court relied heavily on the footnote in the Franks decision
suggesting monetary damages as a remedy."'
The implications of the decision are rather startling. If the
decision were followed generally, employers would be liable for
"back pay to minorities and front pay to incumbents.""' Not
only is the employer liable to discriminatees and incumbents,
but the value of entering a negotiated settlement is reduced.
An employer's liability to employees is not sufficiently clarified
by consent decrees, as presently negotiated, to provide an
impetus for reconciliation. The employer would be wiser to
contest the charges of discrimination in the courts than to
reach a settlement. It is not surprising that the result has met
with a great deal of commentary"' and hostility."7
109. Id. at 436.
110. Id. at 439.
111. Id. at 440.
112. Id. at 439.
113. Id. Obviously there was substantial evidence to support a governmental
pattern-or-practice suit; otherwise it is doubtful that the federal government would
have initiated the action or that A.T.&T. would have settled. The district court did
ignore the express terms of the settlement that no admission or judicial finding of
liability could be inferred from the settlement. See American Tel. & Telegraph Con-
sent Order, [1978] 8 L A. REL. REP. (BNA) 431:73.
114. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
115. See Venick & Lane, supra note 88, at 809. See also Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 n.38. "Front pay" is defined in Franks as
an "award of monetary damages ... in favor of each employee . . . otherwise bearing
some of the burden of past discrimination." Id.
116. See, e.g., Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment
Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL. LAW F. 69, 137-44; Venick & Lane, supra note 88; Com-
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The plaintiff, McAleer, and A.T.&T. eventually settled
out of court for $7500, so it is impossible to state whether or not
the decision will be followed generally."18 Subsequent to
McAleer, the district court which originally entered the
A.T.&T. decree rejected the McAleer "Catch-22" for employ-
ers. Instead, the court suggested that an employer who relied
on a consent decree in good faith should receive some measure
of immunity."'
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court decisions in Teamsters'0
and Bakke'' keep alive the concept of compensation to incum-
bents as the Court evidences concern for equitable treatment
of discriminatees and non-victim employees alike. Majority
expectations, minority rights, and the employers' interests are
all converging in the courts and presenting such disparate
claims that probably no single resolution will seem equitable
to every group. Although perhaps there is no simple solution
given the divergence of claims, there are various possibilities
for successfully dispensing justice under Title VII.
ment, Employer's Dilemma: Quotas, Reverse Discrimination and Voluntary
Compliance, 8 Loy. CH. L.J. 369 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Employer's Dilemma];
Comment, Reverse Discrimination Developments Under Title VII, 15 Hous. L. REv.
136 (1977); Note, Remedies for Non-Minority Employees Under Title VII, 46 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 251 (1978).
117. One recent article citing the McAleer decision urges total resistance to the
EEOC and the "reverse discrimination" of Title VII. Reminger & Ringler, Watch Out-
EEO Agreements and Consent Decrees May Be Booby-Traps, 27 FED'N INS. COUNSEL-
oRs Q. 255 (1977).
118. See Employer's Dilemma, supra note 116, at 382.
119. EEOC v. American Tel. & Telegraph, 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1055 n.34 (E.D.
Pa. 1976). The court of appeals subsequently affirmed Judge Higganbotham's approval
of the consent decree, including the affirmative action override. EEOC v. American
Tel. & Telegraph, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977).
Judge Higganbotham based his suggestion on § 713(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)
(1970), which provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding based on any alleged employment practice,
no person shall be subject to any liability or punishment for or on account
of (1) the commission by such person of an unlawful employment practice
if he pleads and proves that the act or omission complained of was in good
faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any written interpretation
or opinion of the Commission ...
Pursuant to § 713(b), the EEOC has proposed regulations, to be issued at 29
C.F.R. § 1608, which purport to protect employers engaged in voluntary affirmative
action plans from charges of "reverse discrimination." The proposed regulations specif-
ically state that "the lawfulness of such remedial and/or affirmative action program is
not dependent upon an admission, or a finding, or evidence sufficient to prove that
the employer . . . has violated Title VII." The theory underlying the use of § 713(b)
and the new regulations is that employers who rely on the proposed regulations will
be protected from suits charging reverse discrimination.
120. See notes 97-104 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra.
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REMEDIES
Introduction
The suggestions for resolving the problems confronting
employers are based on the following premises, most of which
have been discussed above. First, the underlying theme of this
author's approach is that affirmative action is a current necess-
ity to remedy past and present discrimination against minori-
ties and women.'2 Second, recent cases in the Supreme Court
emphasize that consideration must be given to the interests of
non-minority employees as well as discriminatees when the
expectations of the former may be adversely affected in reme-
dying the effects of past discrimination upon the latter. 3
Third, if an employer cannot rely upon the settlement as deter-
minative of his liability, its value to him is reduced. Indeed, it
may make the option of contesting the charge of discrimination
more attractive. The conciliation process will be detrimentally
affected if the employer is forced to compensate discriminatees
and incumbent employees alike. 24 Finally, if the conciliation
process is to be safeguarded, then all parties whose interests
will be affected by a settlement must be protected to the maxi-
mum extent possible given the divergent claims each brings
into court. Therefore, all parties whose interests will be af-
fected by the consent decree should be represented at some
stage of the proceedings.
There are several procedural methods of insuring that cur-
rently unrepresented third parties whose interests will be af-
fected by the settlement are protected. If the unrepresented
third party is the incumbent, non-minority employee whose
interests are affected by the advent of a Title VII settlement
with his employer, there are at least three methods of safe-
guarding this employee's expectations. The current procedure
of intervention in the proceedings could provide protection of
the incumbent employee's interests. Alternatively, the incum-
bent's interests could be adequately represented throughout
the settlement process if the EEOC issues guidelines adopting
this procedure. Or, the courts could assume this responsibility
by conducting hearings prior to approval of the consent decrees
in which the incumbent's interests would be specially ad-
dressed. An examination of the advantages and disadvantages
122. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 100-103, 107-123 and accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 105-119 and accompanying text supra.
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of each method is appropriate in determining the possibility of
feasible solutions in this area.
Maintenance of the Status Quo: Intervention
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently provide for
intervention in a federal court proceeding either as a matter of
right or as a matter of judicial discretion."5 Aside from the issue
of meeting the proper statutory qualifications, the threshold
barrier to intervention is timeliness.'26 Once a judgment or de-
cree is entered, intervention is very difficult.'2 Even prior to
entry of a decree in the case, intervention may be denied if to
permit it would significantly disrupt the proceedings.'2 Thus,
for the purpose of bringing all parties affected by a settlement
into the proceedings so that the employer may rely upon some
measure of immunity from subsequent suit, intervention will
only function as a remedy where all affected parties are suffi-
ciently aware of the impact of the settlement on their rights so
as to seek intervention. Even then, intervention may be discre-
tionary with the court.
A second look at United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum In-
dustries Inc. ,29 will provide an illustration of the problems in-
herent in the use of intervention as a method of participation
for parties affected by a consent decree. Lengthy negotiations
between the Justice Department,. the Labor Department, and
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 provides for intervention of right on anyone's timely
application if a statute provides "an unconditional right to intervene" or the
"applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction ... and he is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest. ... FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Permissive intervention
is allowed if a timely application is made and "a statute of the United States confers
a conditional right" or "an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
126. Id.
127. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 935 (5th Cir. 1977) (motion to intervene by employees claiming to be adversely
affected by implementation of steel industry consent decrees was properly denied when
seven and one-half months had passed since decree approved); Hefner v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 826 (E.D. La. 1977) (employee who was
aware of terms of consent decree three years ago may not now seek to challenge it as
reverse discrimination); Nevilles v. EEOC, 511 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1975) (employee with
status of "aggrieved party" must nevertheless seek timely intervention).
128. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Air Lines, 515 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1975) (minority
group members not allowed permissive intervention where discovery closed, final
pretrial conference held, and depositions completed); Gerstle v. Continental Air Lines,
Inc., 466 F.2d 1374 (1972) (to allow intervention would unduly delay or prejudice the
rights of the original parties).
129. 63 F.R.D. 1 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See discussion at text accompanying notes 30-39 supra.
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the EEOC as plaintiffs, and nine steel companies and the
United Steelworkers of America as defendants, resulted in an
industry-wide settlement. The settlement was filed simultane-
ously with the suit, and was approved the same day.'30 Shortly
after entry of the decree, three organizations, four individuals,
and six groups of plaintiffs sought intervention.' 31 Most of the
individual plaintiffs and groups of plaintiffs were granted inter-
vention as of right for the limited purpose of staying or vacating
the decrees. The remaining organizations were denied the right
to intervene.
The district court ruled on the intervenors' objections to
the decrees in the same memorandum opinion in which the
motions for intervention were decided. No further evidentiary
hearings were ordered since the motion for intervention was
accompanied by pleadings stating the claims or defenses. 3 1
Several months after the consent decrees were entered, a group
of incumbent employees sought to void the decrees, alleging
that the decrees adversely affected them. 13  Their motion was
denied.
From beginning to end, the procedures employed in
Allegheny-Ludlum appear to have been designed to frustrate
participation in the settlement process by the very individuals,
both discriminatees and incumbent employees, most affected
by its implementation. Little advance notice was given to em-
ployees about the settlement; it was presented as a fait accom-
pli. Indeed, the appellate court rejected the intervenors' argu-
ments that interested private parties and counsel should have
had notice and opportunity to participate in pre-decree nego-
tiations, or at least notice for intervention purposes.' The
court emphasized that discriminatees could always refuse the
awards provided in the settlement and sue for additional relief.
And if McAleer is followed, incumbents may sue and receive
compensation for the employer's "reverse discrimination."
The arguments in favor of the court's decision in the case
are substantial. Factors of judicial economy, complexity of liti-
130. 63 F.R.D. at 3.
131. Intervention as of right was granted to those persons who met the statutory
requirement of "person or persons aggrieved," i.e., those alleging discrimination by
defendants against them in violation of Title VII. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1); 63 F.R.D.
at 4. Intervention was denied to the Ad Hoc Committee, the Rank and File Committee,
and the National Organization for Women. Id.
132. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 75 (3d ed. 1976).
133. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, Inc., 15 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 935 (5th Cir. 1977).
134. 517 F.2d at 875.
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gation if intervention is permitted, and concern for the integ-
rity of the conciliation process itself militate against interven-
tion for any but the most limited purposes. In an industry-wide
settlement, it will not be possible to satisfy all those affected.
For the purposes' for which this settlement was negotiated, it
may have been as fair as possible. Nevertheless, exclusion of
employee input may jeopardize the employer and in turn the
conciliation process itself. Those who participate in the nego-
tiation process may be more prone to abide by its provisions
once the terms are agreed upon.
The Allegheny-Ludlum case demonstrates that timeliness
may be overcome as a barrier to intervention. However, with
permissive intervention, other factors may enter into a court's
decision on the merits. A court may deny intervention on the
grounds that adequate consideration was given to the would-
be intervenor's concerns.'35 In addition, courts will not look
with favor upon a party seeking intervention after refusing an
invitation to participate in settlement negotiations. 3 ' Where
the purpose is to encourage participation in the settlement
process so that optimal consideration can be given to the con-
cerns of all affected parties, intervention may not be a better
route to follow.
Participation in the Settlement Negotiations
Including representatives of all affected groups in pre-de-
cree negotiations would be one method of bypassing the techni-
cal difficulties of intervention.'37 In fact, this possibility has
135. Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (pro-
posed intervenors had adequate notice and were adequately represented by their
union); cf. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976)
(court should be well-informed of views of those who may be adversely affected by a
settlement); United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1975 (non-
class members' interests should be considered when approving settlement).
136. The A.T.&T. consent decree settlement and litigation is instructive on this
point. The Communications Workers of America (CWA), a union, was asked to partici-
pate in the extensive pre-decree negotiations, but refused to participate. Shortly before
the decree was signed, CWA sought to intervene generally, alleging that it would be
adversely affected by the terms of the settlement. Judge Higganbotham denied the
motion. EEOC v. American Tel. & Telegraph, 365 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The
court of appeals agreed that CWA could not intervene generally as a party plaintiff.
506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974). The CWA's delay came back to haunt it when intervention
was allowed, however, as its arguments claiming surprise as a means of vacating the
decrees were not viewed as persuasive by the court in view of the fact that CWA was
invited to participate in pre-decree negotiations. 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
aff'd, 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977).
137. For a comparison of intervention before courts with intervention before
administrative agencies (although in a different context than EEOC negotiations), see
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been raised by the Civil Rights Commission in the context of
assuring input by minorities and women prior to entry of the
consent decree.'3 The concept of participation could merely be
expanded to include incumbent employees.
Complicating the negotiation process, by additional par-
ticipants may be detrimental to the conciliation process.' 39 The
employer might feel more prone to "bargain tough" in the face
of additional demands brought into the conciliation process by
the employee representatives, thus defeating the purpose of
conciliation itself. The goal of including employee representa-
tives in the negotiation process, however, would be to reduce
subsequent litigation by considering the concerns of all parties
prior to entry of the decree.
Inclusion of all affected parties in the negotiation process
would be the simplest method to initiate, procedurally, as it
would require no enabling legislation. The EEOC could simply
issue guidelines regarding third party representation in the pro-
cess. Participation could be limited if the agency felt that ex-
tensive participation would be detrimental to conciliation.11
Third party representation has not yet been accepted as a
means of reducing criticism of consent decree settlements by
minorities and women. Therefore, some experimentation with
this innovative procedure would be necessary in order to fur-
ther evaluate its merits.
Pre-Entry Hearing on Impact of Consent Decree
Intervention may come too late to have any effect on the
settlement process, and third party participation in the nego-
tiation process may impede rather than facilitate conciliation.
A court hearing on the consent decree's impact on third party
expectations prior to approval of the settlement might avoid
these procedural disadvantages. Both discriminatees and in-
cumbent employees could be represented at the hearing and
present objections to the settlement at that time."' The court
Comment, Intervention by Third Parties in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 42
NOTRE DAME LAw. 71 (1966) thereinafter cited as Intervention by Third Partiesl.
138. See CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 560.
139. Zimmer & Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agen-
cies in Antitrust and Employment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private
Interests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163, 184.
140. See Intervention by Third Parties, supra note 137, at 74.
141. Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 139, also suggests two other methods of
insuring that public agencies consciously analyze the effects of their consent settle-
ments on third parties. An agency could publicize the decree 30 days prior to entry as
a comment period. Additionally, agencies could be required to issue an "impact state-
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could consider the objections prior to entry of the decree.
An analogous procedure is followed under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for class actions. Court approval is
required for any settlement or compromise that may be
reached after a Class action is brought.' The courts are con-
cerned that class actions not be settled simply for the benefit
of the representative plaintiff,' and that objections of class
members be considered prior to the decree's approval.'44 The
purpose of court approval in the employment discrimination
context would be somewhat more expansive. The court's pur-
pose in the hearings would be to insure that the interests of all
affected parties have been protected to the maximum extent
possible, given the fact that some displacement of expectations
is unavoidable where the concerns are not reconcilable.
Recent decisions in the federal appellate courts indicate
that some consideration is being given to unrepresented third
parties' interests within the existing framework of the Federal
Rules. The Ninth Circuit recently held that objections to set-
tlement of a Title VII class action by members of the class and
the effect of the settlement on non-class members should be
considered by the district court in approving the decree.' The
Fifth Circuit appraised the impact of a consent decree upon the
seniority expectations of incumbent employees in considering
an appeal to intervene in a class action by black employees
against their employer.' Thus the courts are aware of the diffi-
culties inherent in approving settlements and will use current
procedures where possible to avoid these problems.
Rule 23(e) may not be sufficient in some instances. In
cases where negotiations are carried on between the EEOC and
the employer, discriminatees and incumbents alike may have
very little input into the settlement. Discriminatees may al-
ways choose to opt out of the settlement, although this option
ment" explaining its actions in the settlement and the effects of the settlement on the
parties. Id. at 178-83.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the ap-
proval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs.
143. McArthur v. Southern Airways, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1123 (5th Cir.
1977); Magana v. Platzer Shipyard, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
144. Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 59 F.R.D. 6 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 494
F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1974).
145. Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976).
146. Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977).
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may be of little realistic value to them.'47 Non-minority em-
ployees affected by the decree may have difficulty intervening,
due to factors such as timeliness.'48 Therefore, in instances
where the settlement is reached without input from discrimina-
tees or non-minority employees, and perhaps in those class
actions where discriminatees have reached a settlement but its
impact on incumbent employees has not been assessed, it may
be feasible to hold a pre-entry hearing on the settlement's im-
pact on the interests of all affected employees.
There are drawbacks to this approach. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure would have to be revised to provide for this
innovation. On a policy level, the purposes of embodying settle-
ment agreements in consent decrees to save agency resources
and promote judicial economy are not furthered by this ap-
proach. Given that precise legal rights cannot be determined
within the context of a compromise settlement, parties may
proceed to litigate their special claims in spite of the court's
consideration of the fairness of the proposed settlement. At the
minimum, innovations tend to increase litigation initially and
at the maximum, an entirely new body of judicial distinctions
and refinements could grow as a substitute for the current pro-
cedural limitations on-participation in the settlement process.
Summary
There are no simple solutions, procedurally or otherwise,
to the problem of insuring that all parties' interests are pro-
tected to the maximum extent possible when the claims of all
discriminatees, non-minority employees, and employers are as
difficult to reconcile as they are under Title VII. Current inter-
vention procedures serve to eliminate some possible interven-
ors, thus maximizing judicial economy, but excluding employ-
ees with valid interests to protect. Inclusion of all parties in the
negotiations may destroy the conciliation process itself. Re-
quiring a court hearing on the fairness of the decree may reduce
the benefits conferred by the consent decree process: judicial
economy, agency resource-saving, and reduction of litigation.
The choices are difficult because employment is vital, and
decisions distributing the benefits of employment can never be
easy. Nevertheless, the McAleer case demonstrates that some
147. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
148. See notes 125-136 and accompanying text supra.
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method of reconciling the divergent interests affected by a con-
sent decree must be found in order to protect the conciliation
process itself.
CONCLUSION
This comment has attempted to trace the convergence of
two different themes in American legal thought, the competi-
tive ethic and affirmative action, and to document the effects
of the clash of these norms on a small but important procedure
in Title VII. The issues are difficult to resolve in a legal context
because they are difficult to resolve in social and economic
contexts as well. Courts have the unpleasant task in this area
of deciding not simply who was wronged, but also of distribut-
ing "scarce benefits" of vital importance to all working men or
women.
194
Consent decrees negotiated between the government and
an employer theoretically are not determinative of a discrimi-
natee's rights. It is not surprising, therefore, that under current
procedures an incumbent employee is not bound by the decree
either. In McAleer, a consent decree did not withstand the
charge of reverse discrimination. If consent decrees fall, concili-
ation will become immensely more difficult. Placing the entire
burden for past discrimination on the employer may initially
appear to be an attractive solution to the difficult problem of
who must bear the burden of that discrimination. Employers
may choose to fight in court rather than bear the entire burden,
however, thus devasting the conciliation process. At the outset,
a heightened awareness of the difficulties inherent in any deci-
sion in this area is necessary. Perhaps in this fashion more
equitable solutions can be reached.
Evet Abt
149. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774 (1976).
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